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Abstract. This article considers political implications of the Milgram obedience studies and of how these
studies have fared in professional and lay discourse. A point of departure for the article is a volume
edited by Thomas Blass on the studies.
One might posit that the essence of research in political psychology comprises a demonstration of
psychological phenomena that seem to cause, be functionally associated with, or otherwise be
necessary and/or sufficient in the appearance of important political phenomena. And for those political
psychologists who are impelled to help foster human rights and prevent human atrocity, important
political phenomena would surely include the physically damaging and painful treatment of people as
directed by a figure of authority.
Social psychologist Stanley Milgram carried out such research in the 1961-1962 time frame. He effected
a basic procedure wherein an experimental subject was directed by an experimenter to give
progressively more severe electric shocks to an individual in an adjoining room each time that individual
gave a wrong answer to a memory task. Even though no one was really being shocked, this seemed not
to be apparent to the experimental subject. Each experimental subject seemed to believe that the
individual was being shocked or could be shocked depending on experimental subject choice. Milgram
varied a number of variables including the physical and behavioral presentation of the authority figure,
verbal cues from the individual, and various demographic aspects of the experimental subject. A general
finding was that about 2/3 of the experimental subjects complied with the experimenter’s request to
punish mistakes on the memory task up to the last and most severe shock--i.e., even with dangerous
and potentially fatal shocks of up to 450 volts.
One common interpretation of Milgram’s work is that so-called regular people from many walks of life
can be induced to engage in behavior that many of us might relegate only to those who are pathological,
aberrant, and evil. Ancillary interpretations include that there is pathology, aberrancy, and evil in all of
us; that situational factors may be much more powerful in eliciting behavior than dispositions and traits;
and that we may differ in dispositions as to how situationally influenced we can be.
That Milgram--apparently motivated to understand Nazi and German atrocities during World War II-seemed to be on to something did not seem to be at Issue. Both professional psychologists and the lay
public alike might have expected a mushrooming forth of research building on the Milgram basic
procedure to get at and hopefully minimize and even prevent some variants of human atrocity.
But this did not happen. Instead, many theorists and researchers focused on the ethical treatment of
experimental subjects. Specifically, they explored whether Milgram had engaged in unethical behavior
by inducing experimental subjects to engage the task of whether to shock someone else and to
correspondingly experience noxious cognitive-affective states such as anxiety. The upshot of such ethical
calculus was significant difficulty in building on Milgram’s work. In essence, Milgram’s work became not
a light at the end of the tunnel but only a dead end.
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And why this dead end? There are at least four possibilities. First, Milgram’s work appropriately
sensitized and nurtured an upgraded experimental ethics. With the history of psychology often revealing
a motive to divorce psychology from value and a cognition that this motive could even be actualized,
Milgram demonstrated that there could not be a Solomonic judgment. Once he did this, no more
needed to be done. (However, see Herrera (1997) for an alternative viewpoint.)
Second, Milgram was himself an example of what he sought to study. He directed people to engage in
unethical behavior and, thus, was engaging in it himself. His concern for unethical behavior might even
be considered a reaction formation--being so against something because he was actually for it.
Third, Milgram’s work could have been a motive force to prevent or at least minimize human atrocity
throughout the world. The a posteriori focus on Milgram’s own ethics fulfilled the requirements of a
subjugating discourse leading to a false consciousness among those who might have threatened the
viability of atrocity as a political tool.
Fourth, Milgram’s basic procedure became so well-known that it has by now been socially transformed
into something without further import for understanding or changing the world. Here, Milgram’s work
on authority may have lost its authority. And if political psychologists do not pick up the scent, they may
deserve do lose their authority as well. (See Blass, T. (2000). Obedience to authority: Current
perspectives on the Milgram paradigm. Erlbaum; Butler, P.V. (1998). Destructive obedience in 1924:
Landis' "Studies of emotional reactions" as a prototype of the Milgram paradigm. Irish Journal of
Psychology, 19, 236-247; Herrera, C.D. (1997). A historical interpretation of deceptive experiments in
American psychology. History of the Human Sciences,10, 23-36; Lutsky, N. (1995). When is "obedience"
obedience? Conceptual and historical commentary. Journal of Social Issues, 51, 55-65; Rochat, F., &
Modigliani, A. (1995). The ordinary quality of resistance: From Milgram's laboratory to the village of Le
Chambon. Journal of Social Issues, 51, 195-210; Zimbardo, P.G. (1995). The psychology of evil: A
situationist perspective on recruiting good people to engage in anti-social acts. Japanese Journal of
Social Psychology, 11, 125-133.) (Keywords: Authority, Human Rights, Milgram.)
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